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POINTS OF APPEAL 
1. Whereas appellant is guaranteed effective counsel by the 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment VI (rights of the 
accused) and The Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 (rights 
of accused persons), and Whereas, by statute and judicial 
interpretation that said counsel must be effective in that "proper 
functioning of the adversarial process" must take place to produce 
a just result." (Strickland v. Washington, 466 US at 689) l 
2. Constitutions require "that no accused can be convicted and 
imprisoned, unless he has been accorded the right to assistance of 
counsel." (US v. Tolliver, 937 F.2d 1183 7th Cir. 1991)2 
3. Defense attorney acted below an objective standard of 
reasonableness creating the probability that but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors the results of the proceedings would have 
been substantially different. Counsel's conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the proceedings 
in this case, cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. 
i 
1
 Stickland v. Washington, The benchmark then for judging 
any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether the counsel's conduct 
so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial system that 
the trial cannot be relied on as having just result. 
US v. Tolliver, Constitution requires that no accused can 
be convicted or imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to 
the assistance of counsel. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by the Utah Code Ann., 
Section 78-2A-3 (2)(f), (Court of appeal has jurisdiction over 
"Appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony"). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Was counsel's performance below an objective standard of 
reasonableness ? 
B. Does the reasonable probability exist that but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would 
have been different ? 
C. Did Counsel's conduct so undermine the proper function of the 
adversarial process that the proceedings, in this case, cannot 
be relied on as having produced just results ? 
D. Did counsel's ineffectiveness prejudice appellant's defense 
resulting in loss of constitutional rights? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
.1. Constitution of the United States, Amendment VI (Rights of the 
Accused) 
2. Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 12 
(Rights of Accused Persons ) 
3. Utah State Code Ann. sec 78-2A-3(2)(f) (Jurisdiction) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellant was charged with a second degree felony of Criminal 
(Automobile) Homicide in that it was alleged he, as the actor, 
operated a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of 
.08% or greater and caused the death of another. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Following arraignment and preliminary hearing, appellant, 
through defense counsel James Watts, negotiated with prosecution, 
a plea agreement with the following stipulation: 
For the appellant / defendant: 
1- dismissal of pending criminal charge. 
2- agreement of all parties to induce the Court to 
sentence appellant / defendant on the next lower degree 
of offense ( third degree felony ). 
For the prosecution: 
1- A plea of guilty to a second degree felony, to wit: 
Criminal (Automobile) Homicide. 
Said plea agreement was conceived from the notion of the 
shadow of criminal intent brought to bear from a promised affidavit 
from expert witness, Dr. David Boorman. At sentencing, before the 
Honorable Judge David S. Young, defense counsel James Watts, 
announced, first to the appellant/defendant, the incredibly 
impacting and subsequently hope shattering information that the key 
affidavit from Dr. Boorman would NOT be forthcoming. ,Counsel Watts 
then announced the same incredible news to the Court and 
prosecution. 
Appellant argues that the incredibly inane, blatantly 
ineffective and obvious unprofessional errors in not procuring the 
affidavit nor continuing further court action, until either the 
document or expert witness could be produced, fell far below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and was so prejudicial, that 
but for the unprofessional errors, the results of the proceedings 
would have been different, resulting in loss of appellant's rights. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
there is no evidence to 
Information in this case 
Appellant was charged with Utah Code ann. 76-5-207 
Criminal (Automobile) Homicide, being in the second degree 
punishable by 1 to 15 years in the State Penitentiary 
Appellant pled guilty to said charge on 18 August 1989 
before the Honorable David S. Young Judge Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Appellant was sentenced on 28 September, 1989. by the 
Honorable Judge Young to confinement in the Utah State Prison 
to not less than one nor more than fifteen years and other 
appurtenances. 
Appellant is currently incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison. 
This case was not tried, therefore 
cite in support in a statement of facts, 
is as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant argues: 
That the Constitution of the United States, 6th Amendment and 
the Constitution of Utah article I section 12 guarantees the right 
of effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecution. 
That defendant was entitled to more than just a warm body 
standing next to him during the criminal procedure. 
That no denial of effective assistance of counsel when 
attorney's representation is reasonable. 
That the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the 
6th Amendment is to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair 
trial. 
That judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether the 
counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the proceedings cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result. 
That appellant's counsel, James Watts, presented himself as 
professional, reasonable, and effective in pursuit of appellant's 
defense and indeed was paid a retainer. 
That discussions were held and conclusions were reached where-
by counsel arranged with prosecution the terms of a plea agreement, 
wherein appellant would plead guilty to the charge in trade for the 
dismissal of a pending charge and agreement of all parties to 
induce the court to sentence the defendant under the next lesser 
degree. (3rd degree) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Argument 
Appellant argues he is guaranteed the right of effective 
assistance of counsel by and through the Constitution of the United 
States Amendment VI. Further, Appellant argues he is guaranteed 
the right of effective counsel by and through the Constitution of 
Utah Article I section 12.^ 
Further, United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the 
rights of criminal defendants, stated the purpose of the effective 
assistance guarantee of the VI amendment is to "... ensure that 
criminal defendants receive a fair trial". Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 US 668 (1984)5; McMann v. Richardson, 397 US 759, 
771, n.14 (1970)6; Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 US 335,344-45 (1980)7 
Moreover, Appellant's entitlement extends beyond having just 
a warm body standing next to him during the criminal proceedings 
and reaches to effective assistance of counsel when attorney's 
representation is reasonable and applies to both retained and 
6
 Constitution of the United States Amendment VI - "In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 
* Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 - "In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel." 
5
 Strickland at 689. - " the purpose of the effective 
assistance guarantee of the 6th amendment is not to improve the 
quality of legal representation, although that is a goal of 
considerable importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply 
to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." 
5
 McMann v. Richardson - "Sixth amendment right to counsel 
is right to effective assistance of counsel." 
7
 Cuyler v. Sullivan, "ineffective assistance may not be 
claimed for counsel's actions where no sixth amendment right to 
counsel exists." 
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appointed counsel. 
Appellant's professional relationship with counsel, James 
Watts, predated the instant case and counsel's conduct seemed 
satisfactory to the Appellant taking into account the variety of 
circumstances faced by counsel and seemingly legitimate decisions 
regarding how best to represent criminal defendants. 
Seeking to ensure Appellant's right to a fair trial through 
proper functioning of the adversarial process to produce a just 
result, Appellant retained services of counsel seeking reasonable 
representation. 
Counsel, on its own, conceived and initiated a course of 
action presented to Appellant in several brief meetings; the 
reasonableness of the proposal and the tactical decisions were 
accepted as a tolerable compromise. 
Presented was a proposal wherein Appellant would plead guilty 
to 2nd degree Criminal Homicide in exchange for Prosecution's 
support of Appellant's being sentenced to the next lower severity 
of crime (3rd degree felony) and prosecution's motion for dismissal 
of pending criminal action. As an inducement counsel, in colloquy 
with prosecution, represented the acquisition and presentation of 
a certain affidavit from one Dr. David Boorman. Defense counsel, in 
furtherance of his methodology, purported this expert witness' 
affidavit would indicate a significant lessening of Appellant's 
culpability due to an adverse and debilitating drug interaction 
resulting from said doctor's prescribed use in concert with 
doctor's assurance to Appellant that no adverse effect would result 
in mixing prescribed medication and moderate alcohol intake. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In its landmark decision Strickland v. Washington**, the 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness of counsel "must 
be whether the counsel's conduct so undermined the adversarial 
process, that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a 
just result"; and further "no particular set of detailed rules for 
counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of 
circumstances faced by defense counsel of the range of legitimate 
decisions regarding how best to represent the criminal defendant." 
In Bertolotti v. Dugger9, 838 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 
1989). The court stated "review of assistance should not grade 
counsels performance, but focus on fundamental fairness of 
challenged proceedings." These and many other cases led to the 
Strickland Court assertion "a reasonable probability [of 
ineffectiveness] is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.". 
Georgetown Law Journal concludes (Vol 79 #4 p 969 Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel) "The 6th Amendment guarantees the right to 
effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. In 
Strickland v. Washington the Supreme Court established a two 
pronged standard to govern ineffective assistance claims. The 
defendant must prove (1) That counsel's performance fell below an 
5
 see footnote 1, at 688-689 
9
 Bertolotti v. Dugger, "Federal Court of appeal's role in 
collaterally reviewing state judicial proceeding on ineffective 
assistance claim is not to point out counselor's error, but only 
to determine whether counselor's performance in given proceedings 
was so beneath providing professional norms that attorney was not 
performing as "counsel' guaranteed by Sixth Amendment." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) That there is a 
reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Appellant concurs and so argues. 
Counsel proposed said agreement; Prosecution reticently 
agreed; Appellant, reassured by defense counsel, reluctantly 
agreed; The "Deal was Struck", and the case proceeded to 
sentencing. 
Reciproque to the plea bargain, which was not representative 
of the Appellant's view, the sentencing on the next lower severity 
of crime gave way to legislated rationale in-that criminal homicide 
in the second degree (to which the appellant plead guilty) requires 
"willful, knowing, and reckless gross deviation from the standard 
of care that a normal person would exercise", where-as lacking 
absolute culpability (as appellant asserts) is criminal homicide in 
the third degree (to which the appellant would be sentenced) 
requires "simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of 
care which reasonable and prudent persons exercise." 
Prosecution's part in the agreed plea bargain was to move for 
dismissal of an existing apart change, with which there is no 
argument. Secondly, they were to speak with their silence in favor 
of the motion by counsel for sentencing under the next lesser 
degree of crime. 
Although the Appellant's plea of guilty "is not voluntary 
simply because it is the product of sentient choice, but is 
involuntary if, though it involves al choice, it is the result of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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duress". Heidman v. US, C.A. 8th 1960 281 F.2d 805.10 
"We cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the state to 
extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial 
benefit to the state." Brady v. US, 90 S.Ct. 146311 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11(e) allows plea 
agreements that require the defendant to plead guilty to the 
charged offense, in agreement prosecutor is authorized to (1) 
move for dismissal of other charges; (2)i3 Agree not to oppose 
defendants request for a particular sentence. (3)1 To agree that 
a specific sentence is appropriate for the disposition of the case. 
Defense's part in the agreed plea bargain was to, of course, have 
appellant plead guilty; however, central to the core of the plea 
agreement was the procurement and admission, to the Court, of the 
promised affidavit from Dr. Boorman, appellant's post heart-attack 
physician. 
iU
 Heidman v. US, "A plea of guilty is not voluntary simply 
because it is a product sentient choice, but is involuntary if 
though it involves a choice, it is a result of duress." 
11
 Brady v. US, "We cannot hold that it is unconstitutional 
for the state to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn 
extends a substantial benefit to the state ..." 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e)(1) 
Plea agreement procedure in general. The attorney for the 
gpvernment and the attorney for the defendant . . . engage in 
discussions with the view towards reaching an agreement that, upon 
the entering of a plea of guilty ... to a charged offense ... the 
attorney for the government will do any of the following: 
(A) - Move for dismissal of other charges. 
^ Id. (B) - Make recommendations or agree not to oppose the 
defendant's request for a particular sentence. 
14
 Id. (C) - Agree that a specific sentence is the 
appropriate deposition of case. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court, the Prosecution, and the Appellant, in unison, 
anticipated the production and admission of said document and 
indeed it was predicate to the plea agreement. 
Appellant's decision to participate in the plea agreement, via 
his guilty plea, and prosecution's agreement to speak by their 
silence in support of reduction of sentencing, was held together by 
the very glue of the production of this document. Indeed the very 
life blood that gave the agreement viability, was the admission of 
this document. 
A plea agreement is generally treated as a contract, the 
instant case included; Thus it may be breached. Santobel lo v. New 
York, 404 US 257 1971 15; US v. McCarthy, C.A. 1st. 1970, 
433 F.2d 59116. 
i 
On the morning of Sept. 29th, 1989, (42 days after the 
appellant plead guilty as his part of the plea agreement) before 
the Honorable David S. Young Judge Third Judicial District in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, came the time fixed for the 
sentencing of the appellant. As a matter of course all parties 
concerned, the defendant, the prosecution (Mr. Scott Reed), and the 
Judge, anticipated and expected the production and admission of Dr. 
Boorman's affidavit at the hands of the defense counsel James 
Watts. 
lw
 Santobello v. New York, When a guilty plea rests in any 
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so 
that it can be said to be part of an inducement or consideration, 
such promise must be fulfilled. 
US v. McCarthy, "Sentence based on guilty plea induced by 
reliance on unfulfilled prosecution promise." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Defense counsel, seconds before announcing same to the Court, 
informed the appellant of the unbelievably destructive news that he 
had NOT obtained the affidavit from Dr. Boorman. The defendant was 
heartstruck and in shock. While the brevity of time spent in 
consultation between counsel and appellant does not, without more, 
establish ineffectiveness instead is only a factor to be considered 
in the totality of the curcumstances .Carbo v. US, CA 5th, 1978, 581 
F.2d 91, 92, 93.1] 
Through the mind of the appellant passed the realization that 
all hopes of any sentencing reduction consideration had been dashed 
by defense counsel's ineffectiveness and unprofessionalism in not 
obtaining said affidavit. Defense counsel stood and announced to 
the court and prosecutor the self-same news of his inability to 
produce the document, key to the plea agreement. The prosecutor 
rose instantly and enthusiastically said "We're backing out of our 
deal." The Honorable David S. Young retorted, "I agree," and 
forthwith and without further consideration, sentenced Appellant 
to the full, undiminished, no longer plea bargained sentence of 
1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. Appellant was remanded to 
the custody of the Salt Lake County Sheriff for transport to the 
Utah State Prison, lacking any further action by defense counsel. 
11
 Carbo v. US, When a guilty plea is entered the only 
required duty of counsel in rendering reasonably effective 
assistance is to ascertain if the plea is entered voluntarily and 
knowingly ... the brevity of time spent in consultation with 
counsel does not without more, establish ineffectiveness butinstead 
is only a factor to be considered in the totality of the 
circumstances. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
Appellant concludes that the wanton disregard for 
professionalism, the unreasonableness of the last second disclosure 
of counsel's inability to procure the doctor's affidavit, the 
abject unfairness of non-pursuit in seeking remedy for the 
inability to procure said affidavit by means of continuance, 
subpoena, renegotiation, and/or withdrawal of plea, and the 
objective ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance to appellant, so 
undermined the proper functioning of these proceedings that they 
"cannot be relied on as having produced a just result"; Indeed, but 
for defense counsel's unprofessional errors and ineffective 
counsel, the results of the proceedings would have been 
significantly different; 
Therefore, appellant asserts and claims ineffective assistance of 
counsel in that his Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance 
of counsel in these criminal proceedings were indeed violated. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 687-692 (1984)18 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 US 759, 771 n.14 (1970)19 
US v. Scott, CA 5th, 625 F.2d 623 (1980)20 
see footnote #1 and #5 and other Strickland refs. 
McMann v. Richardson, "6th Amendment rights to counsel is 
right to effective assistance of counsel." 
US v. Scott, "A conviction on a guilty plea that is 
entered solely as a result of faulty advice is a miscarriage of 
justice." 
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Strater v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61 (CA 4th 1979) 21 
Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 613 (CA 10th 1988)22 
And further, prays this Court to remand this case to the 
District Court with an order to allow appellant to withdraw His 
plea of guilty. 
Respectfully Submitted This f^fiffi day ofc=a^ ,^-i^ u^}^u \^ , 1993 
T 
Eduarjzfo Garza 
2i
 Strater v. Garrison,"Judgement of conviction must be 
vacated when it appears that a guilty plea would never have been 
tendered if defendant had been properly advised." 
^ Osborn v. Shillinger, "performance of defense counsel was 
not only constitutionally unreasonable and ineffective, but counsel 
abandoned required duty of loyalty to his client..." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
